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Abstract 
This contribution shall focus on corrupt Port of Rotterdam employees who fulfilled a role 
in the illegal drug trade by being involved in so-called rip-off cases. By ‘rip-off’ is meant 
the use of legitimate cargo and containers to hide bags of drugs, whereas the traditional 
rip-off consists of a buyer being deceived by a drug seller (e.g. purity of drugs is halved). 
To understand the reasons for their corruption, an in-depth qualitative thematic analysis 
of official police files took place in 2014. Although law enforcement agencies explain 
that port employees are solely financially motivated to assist in rip-offs, this study shows 
that their financial motivations are intertwined with social justifications construed by port 
employees during their interrogations. Their self-justifications are focused on 
illegitimately pursuing the legitimate goal of taking care of family, amplified by criminal 
seductions coming from colleagues. Implications for an evidence-based port policing 
aimed to police corrupt port employees, and with it, the illegal drug trade, shall be 
considered as well. 
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2 
Introduction 
 
Between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2014, more than 30 tonnes of various types of 
hard drugs were seized at the Port of Rotterdam by agencies collaborating in the Hit and 
Run Cargo (HARC) team.  The policing agencies working in this collaborative venture 
are the Rotterdam-Rijnmond Seaport Police (ZHP), the Dutch Customs, the Fiscal 
Information and Investigation Service (FIOD) and the Rotterdam Public Prosecutor 
(Openbaar Ministerie Rotterdam, hereafter OMR). These seizures consisted largely of 
cocaine: 3,600 kilograms in 2012; 9,800 kilograms in 2013; and 7,575 kilograms in 2014 
(OMR, 2015). As becomes clear when compared to the other years, throughout 2013 most 
of seizures were made. Moreover, that year over 70 people were arrested (OMR, 2014). 
Amongst these people, several port employees were arrested for assisting during a 
specific and, for smuggling, new modus operandi; the ‘rip-off’ (see below). Ever since, 
law enforcement agencies, the Rotterdam municipality, port authorities and port 
companies have problematized the involvement of corrupt port employees, because it 
sustains illegal drug trafficking “from within”, leading to serious personal harms and 
society-wide damages. Since 2012, therefore, these public-private partners have taken 
their social responsibility to police this issue together in the Port Integrity Programme1 
(OMR, 2016, 2012). The programme creates awareness amongst port companies and 
employees about the security threats involved in drug trafficking and it has introduced 
new port security procedures, while stimulating exchange of intelligence between law 
enforcement and private parties. Next to putting ‘hard measures’ in place, the programme 
additionally commenced a study to understand the reasons why port employees can 
engage in the illegal drug trade. Therefore, the study was set up to answer the following 
research question: Why does the port employee perform corrupt acts in the Port of 
Rotterdam? This paper will provide an answer by firstly elaborating on the context of the 
Port of Rotterdam and the ‘rip-off’. Secondly, methodology and data (gathering) shall be 
considered, followed by the main results of the study. Afterwards, the implications of this 
study results for policing policies shall be considered and recommendations will be made. 
 
Context 
The Port of Rotterdam  
Although the 2008 financial crisis had a negative impact on the overall international 
seaborne trade, the containerised cargo, accounting for half the value of the global 
                                                 
1
 Translated from Dutch: het Integere Haven Programma. 
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seaborne trade, grew from 2010 until 2012  (UNCTAD, 2014). The most recent 
observations available show that the ‘[container] volumes on the Asia–Europe and trans-
Pacific container trade lanes (peak leg) reversed trends and recorded robust growth during 
the year [of 2014]’ (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 3). As one of the world’s 20 leading ports 
(UNCTAD, 2013, p. 88) and the most important European port (ibid., p. 98), the Port of 
Rotterdam has a crucial role in the international transport of containers. The largest 
proportion of ships over 500 tons, plying the world’s sea routes, make their first and/or 
last port of call in the Port of Rotterdam (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). In the last couple of 
years, well-over 7 million containers entered and left the Port of Rotterdam, accounting 
for the lion’s share of container throughput in Europe (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 
2015). Next to its logistical importance in the international supply chain, it is an important 
hub for cargo and metal theft, as well as the illegal transport of contraband cigarettes, 
human trafficking, wildlife and the illegal arms trade (Eski, 2011). Criminal organisations 
operating in seaports throughout the world, have been active in the Port of Rotterdam as 
well, and they have exploited ports for their logistical position, especially in relation to 
the illegal drug trade (Bovenkerk et al., 2003; De Jong and Voskuil, 2010; Farrell, 1998; 
Fijnaut et al., 1998; Gratteri and Nicaso, 2008; Gruter and Van De Mheen, 2005; 
Kleemans and Boer 2013). Zaitch’s ethnographic study focused on the cocaine trade 
between the Netherlands and Colombia (2002) and he explored how Columbian 
traffickers in the late 1990ies made sense of their line of illegal trade, also in the Port of 
Rotterdam. An interesting finding was how the size—approximately 6000ha (Port of 
Rotterdam Authority, 2014)—and the enormous volume of cargo that comes through the 
Port of Rotterdam consisting in 2015, for example, of 19.564.186 containers (Port of 
Rotterdam Authority, 2016), lowers ‘the risk of interception [by authorities], since the 
illegal merchandise was easier to conceal’ (Zaitch, 2002, p. 243). Given this strategic 
advance for smugglers, the Port of Rotterdam can attract criminal networks to use its 
spaces for drug trafficking, such as the ‘rip-off’. But what is the ‘rip-off’? 
The ‘rip-off’ in port security 
The ‘rip-off’ in port policing and security should not be confused with a popular 
explanation of a ‘rip-off’ in the drug dealing domain. The ‘rip-off’ tactic as defined by 
the World Customs Organization (2008) differs from the ‘rip-off’ encountered in the 
drugs trade. In the latter case, a dealer would rip off his customer by selling fake or the 
wrong type of drugs for the same amount of money one would pay for the expected drugs 
(Jacquesa et al., 2014). Drug trafficking modus operandi and criminological studies of 
them are numerous (cf. Paoli and Reuter, 2008; Pearson and Hobbs, 2001; Reuter and 
Haaga, 1989; Zaitch, 2002). However, the ‘rip-off’ is a new modus operandi of 
transporting drugs, and thus hardly researched (Den Dekker, 2012; Smits, 2014; Van der 
Laan, 2012). 
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In the domains of port security and law enforcement at the waterfront, the term 
‘rip-off’ should be understood as a global phenomenon with respect to it being a modus 
operandi for the smuggling and illegal transportation of contraband, especially illegal 
narcotics, worldwide. A ‘rip-off’ then is defined as ‘contraband placed inside the 
container near the doors and without the knowledge of the shipper/consignee’ (World 
Customs Organization, 2008, p. 29). The method thus entails the use of legitimate 
shipments as camouflage to traffic drugs from the country of origin to the country of 
destination (UNODC, 2016). Both shipper and consignee do not know that their shipment 
is used for drug trafficking though. The trafficked drugs—mostly cocaine—is packed in 
carryalls and placed in a container with the legal goods. Once the container arrives at the 
port of disembarkment, the carryall is taken out by “couriers” (Den Dekker, 2012). A 
crucial element of the ‘rip-off’ is the little amount of time and effort invested in getting 
the carryall(s) out of the container. The ‘rip-off’ has a high(er) success rate by having 
complicit parties in the country of origin, the transhipment port and the country of 
destination (National Crime Agency, 2014). These complicit parties can include port 
employees who are approached by criminal networks to work for them and become 
corrupt. Initially, they are asked to assist for which they receive money; the second time, 
pictures of family, relatives or friends are shown. For example, a father would be shown 
a photograph of his child at the school yard; this way a port employee is blackmailed by 
third parties. 
Port employees are crucial for criminal networks, because they can operate 
incognito and move around unchecked rather easily at the port facilities. Their stealth is 
increased in case they work at a port facility for a shorter time. Moreover, when they 
routinely change in shift crew set up, it is harder to determine who might be involved in 
a ‘rip-off’ (Den Dekker, 2012). What makes port employees especially vital for the ‘rip-
off’, is their easy access to confidential information about container stack positions and 
ship origins, arrivals and departures (Smits, 2014). In ‘rip-off’ cases, generally, port 
employees use a day off, the weekends or breaks during work to move around at the port 
facility to (help) fulfil the ‘rip-off’ (Van der Laan, 2012). 
Given their freedom of movement and access, three types of criminal behaviour 
have been identified. A port employee can 1) be actively involved by breaking open the 
container and take out the carryalls; 2) place the container at a more convenient spot for 
others to retrieve the bags from the containers; or 3) lend out one’s ID card or pass on 
relevant secret information to others who complete the ‘rip-off’ (Smits, 2014; Van der 
Laan, 2012). Due to the immense size of container terminals, finding a specific container 
is like looking for a needle in a haystack; criminal networks simply cannot operate 
without insider knowledge, meaning, a ‘rip-off’ cannot happen without the involvement 
of a corrupt port employee. 
How many ‘rip-off’s have been completed in the Port of Rotterdam is hard to 
determine, but estimations strongly indicate a relatively small number of cases. For 
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example, it is known the Rotterdam HARC team got confronted in 2013 with 47 ‘rip-off’ 
cases, yet a dark number remains (Smits, 2014). Therefore, (the conceptualisation of) the 
‘rip-off’ phenomenon comes forward from specific cases, meaning, it is difficult to 
provide a precise and significant calculation of the number of occurrences and thus further 
(investigative) research is required. Still, what is known is that the amount of involved 
Rotterdam port employees, as a threat from within, has grown since 2010. However, 
instead of focusing on the quantitative dimensions of the ‘rip-off’, and given that corrupt 
port employees are critical to the ‘rip-off’ tactic, this study focusses on what motivates 
them–or what they say motivates them–to understand the nature of the involvement in the 
‘rip-offs’.  
 
Corruption, the port and port employees  
The port employees who feature in this study work at port facilities in Rotterdam, as well 
as at law enforcement agencies operational in the Port of Rotterdam. During the analysis, 
it became clear officials of law enforcement agencies too have been involved in ‘rip-off’ 
cases, however, due to issues around breaching confidentiality and the limited 
information available about these cases, those files have been left out of the analysis. 
Nevertheless, given recent cases of corruption at departments of the customs agency 
operating in the Rotterdam port (NOS, 2015), it is strongly recommended that future 
research should consider these specific employees operating in the port. Hence, it is 
important for security and law enforcement agencies in ports around the world have a 
greater awareness of authorities being involved in the rip-off. 
There are many types of port employees, ranging from crane operator to stevedore, 
and from team manager to straddle carrier drivers. They all have access to the port 
facilities. They have specific (and for criminal organisations valuable) knowledge of the 
territories and the logistical processes taking place there, which they have used to assist 
in the ‘rip-off’. Their corrupt behaviour, being that of an exchange of favours and 
eventually an illicit gain and an acquisition of income position (cf. Hough, 2013). In line 
with criminological attention for occupational crime and corruption in the Netherlands 
(Cools, 1994; Van de Bunt et al, 2011; Van Erp et al., 2011) and due to investigative 
research on ‘rip-off’s in Rotterdam (Dekker, 2012; Smits, 2014; Van der Laan, 2012), 
criminological interest in corruption (by port employees) in Rotterdam has been sparked 
and initiatives have been undertaken to explore this type of criminal activity (OMR, 2016). 
Hoekema’s unique socio-legal study (1973) focused on port employees involved 
in cargo theft in Rotterdam, late 1960s. His findings revealed that port employees had 
different thoughts about what property (rights) are; they denied others’ ownership of the 
goods and anticipated some goods would get destroyed or written off as ‘damaged’. They 
considered it justified to take ‘unsaleable items’ away. Their shift work patterns led to 
legitimisation of such practices, to the extent that it would be considered strange and 
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deviant if a port employee would not steal cargo. In fact, not stealing would go against 
their social rules. Also, in case theft would be detected, port companies tended to avoid 
reporting it to the port police out of fear of getting a bad reputation within the industry, 
sustaining further (cultivation of) theft by port employees. 
Zaitch (2002) too looked at corruption of port workers and officials in Rotterdam, 
and their involvement in Columbian drug trafficking. According to his informants, 
‘harbour employees were […] easily involved’ (Zaitch, 2002, p. 253). Still, compared to 
the Netherlands, ‘other countries such as Russia, Spain or Italy have better conditions for 
the development of collusion between the State, local powers and illegal enterprises’ 
(ibid., p. 254). 
The Netherlands has witnessed an increase in the number of corruption and fraud 
investigations from 2003 (N = 135) until 2010 (N = 301)2 (Slingerland et al., 2012), and 
the stand-alone cases in the Port of Rotterdam imply that corruption amongst port 
employees exists. However, more recent critical research and international scrutiny by 
NGOs still indicate that corruption in the Netherlands is not as prevalent as it is in other 
countries (and their ports) (Chatwin, 2016, p. 7; Transparency International, 2016, p. 6).  
 
Methodology 
Rotterdam has a prominent position in the international supply chain and there is a risk 
that it can be exploited as a drug trafficking hub (Bovenkerk et al., 2003; De Jong and 
Voskuil, 2010; Eski, 2011; Fijnaut et al., 1998; Gratteri and Nicaso, 2008; Gruter and 
Van De Mheen, 2005; Kleemans and Boer, 2013; Paoli and Reuter, 2008; Zaitch, 2002). 
Although there have been a relatively small number of cases, the Port of Rotterdam 
therefore presents an important case study for researching the nature and impact of 
corruption of port employees through their involvement in the ‘rip-off’ technique and for 
examining how evidence-based policing solution could be put in place. This study 
focused specifically on port facilities that cover most of the container handling in Europe 
(Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2015). More importantly, at these facilities, almost all 
registered ‘rip-off’ cases took place. The registered ‘rip-off’ cases were qualitatively 
analysed, using files of detailed closed criminal investigations by the port police and 
customs agencies. These files formed a rich source of data, consisting of various 
demographics (age, gender, addresses and length of employment3) of the convicted port 
employees, witnesses and victims. Transcripts of police interview and telephone taps, as 
well as pictures of key sites were included. Also, bank account details, information about 
products bought with the illegally obtained money, details of ships, locations and 
containers were recorded. The analysis was undertaken by reviewing transcripts of police 
                                                 
2
 These are the most recent official statistics available on Dutch corruption and fraud cases. 
3
 Due to anonymisation, no information here is shared about the age range, locations, companies, dates, 
times, and an exact number of specific type of employment. 
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interviews in which port employees made their statements. In particular attention was 
paid to the thematic variety of and similarities between statements of port employees on 
their reasons to assist during ‘rip-offs’. Data was additionally retrieved from the 
investigation and trial files, again from port employees’ statements. Several major themes 
and subcategories arose, as shall be explored in the following section. Moreover, all the 
other aforementioned sources (telephone taps, pictures, witness declarations) were used 
to provide a broader knowledge of each case. 
Although policing authorities in the port have been occupied with ‘rip-off’ cases 
for several years now, it has to be mentioned here that this study has been the first 
criminological attempt to retrieve a structured overview of and understanding of ‘rip-
offs’ in the Port of Rotterdam. Therefore the study has faced several complexities and 
limitations. First, police files and cases, generally, are limited depictions of events that 
happened, exactly because they are constructed by a specific group of people (Clarke et 
al., 1998). Therefore, this research should not be misinterpreted as fully representative of 
the ‘rip-off’ complexity and corruption in ports, even more so because of the effect of 
police priorities can have on starting investigations (Kleemans, 2013). Second, for some 
cases access was not granted due to ongoing investigations or the researchers’ level of 
security clearance was insufficient. It was therefore difficult to immediately retrieve an 
overview of the registered ‘rip-off’ method cases. In fact, a list of suspect and convicted 
port employees simply did not exist, because the term ‘port employee’ was absent in most 
files. It led to a demanding inventory of cases. Third, another difficulty was how police 
and customs interrogators did not always have a strong (investigative) interest in port 
employees’ reasons for getting involved. In those instances, statements from other 
suspects and witnesses were collected to still gain insight in motivations. Also, 
transcriptions phone taps turned out to be a helpful alternative to find and understand 
motivations. Complementary to this, was an analysis of ‘rip-off’ cases described in annual 
reports of the Rotterdam HARC team. Moreover, experts at relevant law enforcement 
agencies and amongst private stakeholders were anonymously interviewed and 
specifically asked about their knowledge of relevant ‘rip-off’ cases, leading to more cases 
in which port employees were involved. A selection of ‘rip-off’ method cases was made 
based on the following core criteria: 
 
- There had to be at least one port employee actively and/or passively, but 
always knowingly involved; 
- A port employee worked either in paid employment or as a temporary worker; 
- The ‘rip-off’ was the means of drug trafficking; 
- The drugs had to be transported in(to) and/or out of the Port of Rotterdam. 
 
Eventually, based on those selection criteria, 22 cases were selected, in which 51 involved 
port employees played a role. In the end, 14 cases with 40 involved port employees were 
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qualitatively analysed, of which 24 port employees and 9 relevant others are mentioned 
and quoted directly in the key findings section (see Table 1. for a detailed overview). The 
quoted material comes from the police reports that were made available to the authors. 
These reports contained predominantly transcripts of police interviews, investigation 
reports, and trial files, as well as telephone taps, pictures, bank account details, 
information about products bought with the illegally obtained money, details of ships, 
locations and containers were recorded. From the key findings, we will retrieve lessons 
for a possible evidence-based port policing approach (Sherman, 2013). Evidence for such 
an approach result from that analysis and is presented in the following section. 
 
Table 1.  Sources analysed  
Source  Justification for rip-off involvement Source of information 
Port employees4   
Adelin  • Financial hardship • Drug addiction (cocaine) Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Aldrick • Supporting family • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Arnaud • Approached by family members 
involved in rip-off • Drug addiction (cocaine) 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Aubin • Supporting family • Financial gain/greed Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Augustin • Financial hardship • Gambling addiction Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Baptiste • Financial hardship • Gambling and drug (cocaine) 
addiction 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Beauvais • Financial gain/greed • Drug (cocaine) addiction Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Bellamy • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off • Financial gain/greed 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Briand • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off • Jealous of colleagues’ gained 
riches out of rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Campbell • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
                                                 
4
 The names used throughout the article are fictional names. 
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• Drug (cocaine) addiction 
Casijn • Financial hardship • Supporting family • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Cheval • Supporting family • Alcohol and drug (cocaine) 
addiction 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Dureau • Financial hardship • Supporting family Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Emilien • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Evian • Supporting family Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Florian • Financial hardship Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
François • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Gaillard • Financial hardship • Supporting family Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Gaspard • Financial hardship • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Guifford • Financial hardship • Supporting family Police report (2013) made available to the authors 
Kylian • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Leroi • Alcohol addiction • Financial gain/greed • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Milo • Financial hardship • Convinced by colleagues involved 
in rip-off 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Reynaud • Alcohol and drug (cocaine) 
addiction • Shop addiction • Financial hardship 
Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Others • Connection to port employees  
Amélie Briand’s partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
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Gabrielle  Gaspard’s partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Genevieve  Adelin’s partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Jean-Marc  Arnaud’s brother-in-law Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Justyne  Beauvais’ partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Maroly  Arnaud’s partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Merlion  Member external criminal network Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Odyle Casijn’s partner Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
Rique Former Arnaud’s brother-in-law Police report (2013) made 
available to the authors 
   
 
Key findings 
Addictions 
One of the main reasons why port employees become involved in ‘rip-offs’ revealed in 
this study is the need to feed a drug and/or other addictive habit. As one defendant, for 
whom we shall use the pseudonym, of ‘Baptiste’, explained: 
 
I’ve been a drug addict since I was 16 years old. XTC and coke, amongst others, 
at parties. After that I smoked joints for a while, but the last six months I haven’t 
used anything. I think I took coke for a year. At the moment, I sometimes use it at 
a party. During [a festivity] for example, I got a half a gram pack of cocaine. I 
snort the cocaine. I did look for getting help [at a clinic] in quitting (Baptiste). 
 
It should be noted here that, although most of the convicted port employees (presented 
themselves to) have genuine reasons, as the following section on family will show, some 
of them who got involved in the ‘rip-off’ have done so to feed their drug habit. So, the 
first, and smaller category of justifications used by port employees was focused on 
(former) addictions, as port employee Baptiste declared during his interrogation (see 
above quote). He, like the other port employees, assisted during ‘rip-offs’, because his 
drug addiction got him in financial hardship. This type of combined criminal behaviour 
is not that different from drug use and, for example, getting involved in drugs dealing and 
(gang-related) violence (Fagan, 1989). In some cases, port employees started to use 
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cocaine again (or more of it) because of experienced stress resulting from the fear of 
getting arrested: 
 
A week before [the ‘rip-off’], we knew the container [with drugs] would arrive, 
however, on the day itself, as soon as the ship is moored, the guys can see whether 
the codes are on [the container] or not. If there are codes attached to it, the guys 
won’t touch it. So, on the day [of the ‘rip-off’] itself, I know if it’ll take place. I 
was at Gaillard’s [another port employee] place in December […] I think it was 
in the afternoon. The night before, I remember, I used some coke, ’cause I was so 
nervous (Casijn). 
 
The study indicates that, next to drug addiction, a gambling problem may be the next most 
prevalent cause of financial hardship, at least on the basis of the suspects interviewed, 
eventually leading to port employees participating in ‘rip-off’s as well: 
 
I had gambling debts at illegal casinos. […] I’m not sure how much debt I had, 
but it was a lot. I think it was, at least, € XX.XXX5. I paid off this debt with the 
profits from my cocaine dealing (Guifford). 
 
Or as Augustin explained: 
  
I was gambling in a casino […] I lost €XXX in a game of Blackjack. [A recruiter 
from a criminal network] was playing and saw I lost that €XXX. I was fed up 
about losing my money. It’s rather normal to find out if any familiars could borrow 
money from. Or you look around to see who’s doing well and you’d ask that 
person. I saw [the recruiter] was having a good night, [given] the way he was 
betting, he must have had at least €XX.XXX on him. A gambler sees that. I had a 
chat with him and at a certain point I asked him if he could barrow me some 
money. I got €XXX, under the condition I’d pay him back the next week. I also 
lost that €XXX and went back home (Augustin). 
 
Later, Augustin would get involved in a ‘rip-off’ via that recruiter. His debts would get 
cleared if he would assist in the crime. Therefore, port employees justify their corrupt 
behaviour by telling about their drug and/or gambling addiction. This is a combination of 
deviant behaviours associated with problematic and criminal behaviour, as previously 
                                                 
5
 For reasons of anonymisation, there are no precise amounts reported as they make criminal cases and 
those involved identifiable. 
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observed in literature (Bensimon et al., 2013; Le and Gilding, 2014). Another justification 
to assist in ‘rip-offs’ is not necessarily to get rid of addiction-based debts, but to have 
enough money for their family. This turned out to be one of the main justifications. 
Family 
 
My wife is more religious than I am. It’s because of her I started praying more. 
[…] I’m a family man. I’m happy with my wife and kids (Evian). 
 
Evian, a port employee for over eight years, argued he enjoyed his job, is religious and is 
blessed he has a loving family life. The portrayal of the benevolent pater familias was 
given by many more port employees, communicating they would do anything for their 
family. This role makes them feel pressured to solve a financially problematic situation 
at home, with parents or siblings, it was argued, leading to participation in ‘rip-offs’. For 
example, port employee Gaspard and his wife Gabrielle took a second mortgage that was 
becoming impossible to pay off. To solve it, Gaspard assisted during a ‘rip-off’ once; he 
never let Gabrielle know though, he emphasized. Port employee Florian was in debt to 
his family, friends and neighbour, and his partner had debts at several boutiques; he felt 
it was time to do something about it, by which he justified his ‘rip-off’ complicity after-
the-fact. Casijn justified in a similar fashion: 
 
I wanted to live a normal life with Odyle [Casijn’s partner]. Odyle partakes in a 
debt relief scheme. She gets €XX a week to live off. That’ll last for one and a half 
years. We also want to have a baby. It was the reason to do something stupid. […] 
She had a debt of about €XX.XXX. I just wanted to get rid of those debts and 
make a new start, with a little one (Casijn). 
 
According to Casijn, Odyle helped him to get rid of his cocaine addiction and gave him 
a stable life, and purpose. He felt he had to give something in return, even if that would 
mean doing something illegal. Dureau too thought one ‘rip-off’ would give him the means 
to support family, in this case by paying off alimony through which he wanted to offer 
his son a (better) future. Some port employees explained they felt the need to discuss it 
with their partners: 
 
I discussed it with my girlfriend and decided to do it that way, to get away from 
troubles. I had no more faith at that point. I was scared my relationship would get 
destroyed because of debt and saw no more solution for the misery (Baptiste). 
 
It happened that family got drawn into the port employee’s complicity (unintended), by 
enjoying the financial riches that were earned by assistance during the ‘rip-off’: 
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During my holidays […] I took an amount of about €XX.XXX in cash from 
[country A]. Of this amount, my fiancée already took a few thousand euros from 
[country A] to [B] (Guifford).  
 
Still, most port employees kept it secret to their family that they were (actively) involved 
in ‘rip-offs’, like Adelin: 
 
I didn’t tell my girlfriend [Genevieve] I was being watched [by the police]. I was 
burying my head in the ground. Genevieve did know I’d get money from [his 
colleague] Campbell. I told Genevieve [the trafficking] was about cigarettes and 
not cocaine. I also told her she didn’t have to worry about anything (Adelin). 
 
Adelin did not have to do it for the money, because together with his partner, he had a 
decent income. To still justify his involvement, he felt the need to lie to his partner. In 
similar fashion, port employee Briand told his partner Amélie it was about smuggling 
gold. Aubin stated that his daughter never knew how he earned his money, only that 
Aubin had a little business in trading jewellery, watches and art. Whether family was 
made aware or not, the fact port employees claimed their loved ones were not told 
(entirely) about their involvement, is a sign they want to keep family safe from 
prosecution by authorities and retaliation by the criminal network. However, in a few 
cases, partners were fully aware, like Malory, Arnaud’s partner: 
 
During opening and tasting the cocaine, I, [colleague] Beauvais and [Beauvais’ 
partner] Justyne were there. Malory was in the kitchen at that moment and did not 
really want to get involved. Obviously, she learned about it and saw what 
happened. She was pretty pissed off at me about what happened that night 
(Arnaud). 
 
Malory did not participate in the eventual ‘rip-off’, and tried to deny Arnaud’s 
involvement, Arnaud explained. Gabrielle, Gaspard’s partner, too tried to deny Gaspard’s 
involvement but eventually accepted his role: 
 
Well, it was his job and I think Gaspard did it in the wrong way, because what you 
can do rightfully [handling containers], can be done wrongfully too. They made 
of Gaspard a stooge, to find out where the container [with drugs] was located and 
whether he could take it away. […] I became complicit in it and denied it 
(Gabrielle). 
 
In one case, and therefore exceptional, a partner experienced severe trauma: 
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[We had] two people visiting us. One of them was 2 metres high, had a gun. They 
were shouting ‘We’ll do this! And we want that!’ When they left, my wife took a 
hit to her ribs and [got] three broken toes, because [one of the two] stamped on 
her feet with his heel. Later on, she was beaten up by Merlion [Emilien’s 
colleague] (Emilien). 
 
So, as much as the port employee tried to safeguard family by doing something criminal 
for once, a harmful situation can develop for that very same family. 
Next to being a good partner and father, port employees declared to be a good 
brother or son, arguing they got involved to help out their relatives. Cheval regrets he 
does not see his parents as often as he did before, because he worked a lot:  
 
My expenses are below €XXXX. I could easily live off of [my income], but I 
support my parents, because they got a mere €XXX worth of pension […] I just 
wanted to do good. To get my parents on a holiday, spoil my brother. They 
deserved it (Cheval). 
 
Due to his feeling guilty for not being a good son or brother, he felt the need to have more 
money, for which he saw no other option then to participate during a ‘rip-off’. Another 
way for port employees to justify their corruption, was by arguing family got them 
involved in drug trafficking: 
 
About a year ago, I was approached by Rique, a former brother-in-law of mine. 
Rique asked me to get certain containers out of the port, that would then go to 
[another port company], under the guise of [a certain legal activity]. In reality 
though, out of these containers goods [drugs] had to be taken out. […] I obviously 
refused back then. It would have been containers from South America and I did 
understand it would be related to smuggling cocaine (Arnaud). 
 
Although Arnaud ‘obviously refused’ to participate, a couple of years later, he took a 
different path when he was approached by a relative: 
 
Jean-Marc, my [current] brother-in-law, was with me when we delivered this 
container with cocaine in XXXX. When the bags were taken out of the container, 
he remained in the [truck] cab. I saw that Jean-Marc looked into the mirror of the 
truck when François [another port employee] walked behind the truck with the 
suitcase [with drugs]. I assume he must have seen François walking with those 
bags. We never talked about it again, but when we just left, I did say to him: ‘I 
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think they were friends of Rique.’ I can’t recall how Jean-Marc responded to it. 
We sort of kept our mouths shut about it actually (Arnaud). 
 
Indeed, family members could be the very motivators for their corruption (cf. Ianni and 
Reuss-Ianni, 1972). They would also explain colleagues involved in ‘rip-offs’, who could 
therefore be considered “deviant peers” (Warr, 2002) at work, would motivate them to 
assist as well, as the following will explore. 
 
Colleagues 
 
Evian worked as a port employee for 8 years. Bellamy 10 years. Augustin 12 years. 
Emilien 22 years. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, the longest established, most successful 
and most highly regarded employees feature strongly among the offenders. This strong 
connection is also reflected in their close personal ties with some of their colleagues, who 
they would meet outside work and would know each other’s partners. Their colleagues, 
port employees of this study declared, introduced to the world of drug trafficking and 
‘rip-off’ deals to them. Colleagues as companions in corruption generally is common 
(Anand et al., 2004; Warr, 2002), also corruption and its connection with drug smuggling 
(Carter, 1990). As one port employee, Baptiste, told: 
  
I knew [port employee Campbell]. I knew he was a lasher at the docks. […] I 
know him for almost two or three years now. I was out of touch with Campbell 
but got back in contact with him afterwards. That happened through a friend of 
mine, [port employee] Adelin (Baptiste). 
 
Casijn provided a similar justification when he was asked about how he got involved: 
 
[Former port employee] Gaillard approached me around that time [in December]. 
He worked for three years at [the company]. He was the one from whom I know 
he would lend out his access card or would himself pick up the illegal goods. […] 
There’s talk about “bags”, but everyone knew it was about drugs. Gaillard left the 
scene end of 20XX or start of 20XX. He didn’t have an access card [of that 
company] anymore. First he fixed someone else’s access card. That guy got fired 
and that’s when Gaillard approached me, I think two weeks ahead of it. He got in 
touch with me at a bar. We also saw each other outside of work once and a while. 
[In the bar] he and the other guy started about [the access card]. The guy gave 
Gaillard his card when Gaillard left that company. […] While they were emptying 
a container, getting the bags, [port employee] Kylian saw the customs and 
cancelled the deal. I think they dropped some stuff as well. They lost the drugs 
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and the guys were left with a debt of €X million. How this debt was paid off, I 
don’t know. I heard this from Gaillard somewhere in December 20XX, when I 
was good friends with him and I was given a bigger part [in the ‘rip-off’] (Casijn). 
 
Port employees were not usually approached by any random colleague, but they would 
often know them very well: 
 
It happened […] via a former colleague. […] I ran into him in a bar in XXXX. 
[…] I was pretty drunk, snorted [cocaine] and thought I had to do it [the ‘rip-off’ 
deal]. I made a mistake by not saying no (Leroi). 
 
Port employees stated their colleagues promised all kinds of riches they could retrieve by 
participating, by which port employees implied they were seduced to become complicit 
(cf. Katz, 1990): 
 
When [port employee] Baptiste took that XX kilos [of drugs out of the container], 
I was told the day after it was a success. […] It’s easy money with not so much 
risk involved and it happened a lot around me anyway (Adelin). 
 
Port employees would also see the riches their colleagues gained, and therefore, once 
more, be seduced: 
 
About a year ago, I noticed Guifford apparently owned a lot of money. He bought 
[an expensive car of brand A], [another expensive car of brand A] and [an 
expensive car of brand B] rather shortly after each other. The last time I saw 
Guifford, he was driving in an [expensive car of brand C]. In the meantime, he 
drove around in an [expensive car of brand D]. […] The last time I was there, 
while picking up the € XX.XXX […] I saw he made some major refurbishments 
where he lived. I spotted a new kitchen, and new furniture. I thought it was weird 
he refurbished so much in a rental house (Briand). 
 
Port employees claimed they were lured into the ‘rip-off’ because their colleagues would 
know about their debts (as a result of their drugs and/or gambling addictions). Their 
colleagues who tempted the port employee to participate knew that those port employees 
were in trouble and would therefore be more willing to assist. Reynaud, for example, 
explained he was asked by his colleague Milo firstly about his personal difficulties 
regarding his debts, before Milo would convince Reynaud to participate. So, whereas the 
port employee reveals to have given into ‘the desire for status [in this case ‘having no 
debts’] in the eyes of one’s peers’ (Katz, 1990, p. 147), the colleague here is thus 
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(presented as) a serpent that exploits that desire and seduces the port employee into 
corruption. 
 
 
Port employees’ reasons for ‘rip-off’ participation: some considerations 
 
Justifications: Underlying causes: 
  
Addiction and gambling problems Financial hardship 
Support and protection of family (values) Financial hardship/strong family bonds  
Lying to relatives about involvement crime monetary gain/strong family bonds 
Pressure and seduction by colleagues Strong collegial bonds 
Table 1: overview of justifications and underlying causes. 
 
Here, we shall briefly consider the main reasons to behave corruptly and engage with the 
‘rip-off’, based on the above table. Overall the findings have revealed that their financial 
motivation is connected with other justifications that have less to do with monetary gain. 
First of all, to be motivated to assist during ‘rip-offs’, port employees would refer to their 
histories of drug use and/or gambling to point out how they were financially deprived 
before. Secondly, they argued they felt compelled to participate and complete a ‘rip-off’ 
deal, because of pressures to safeguard and live up to family values and expectations. It 
shows they experience an existential fear of losing family (values), as a result of not being 
able to provide a (financially) safe and secure habitat for partner, children and relatives. 
It might explain why during interrogations they aimed to protect family by explaining 
that in case they would inflict possible harm on their family by sharing (too much) 
information with the police. It could lead to the criminal network behind the ‘rip-off’ 
operation to retaliate, threatening and targeting family members. Then again, family was 
also used to justify one’s corruption, by claiming family members approached them to 
help them out during a ‘rip-off’ deal. Thirdly, and finally, port employees became corrupt, 
because, they would explain, they were seduced by (former) colleagues who introduced 
them to the quick-fix riches that can be gained. In their experience, the ‘rip-off’ was 
(presented as) a possible way out of a deprived domestic situation. Seemingly problematic 
is whether they lied about their motivations or not, because it is difficult to discover and 
evidence if justifications (or neutralization) took place before a criminal act (Maruna and 
Copes, 2004). So, it is not certain whether the port employees justified before they 
participated during ‘rip-off’s. What is certain though, due to this study being an analysis 
of declarations post ‘rip-off’, is that their justifications are ‘after-the-fact rationalizations 
rather than before-the-fact neutralizations’ (Hirschi, 2009, pp. 207–208). 
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Recommendations 
The evidence provided by this study can be used for an evidence-based port policing 
approach (cf. Lum and Koper, 2014; Sherman, 2013) to the ‘rip-off’ and wider corruption 
in ports, offering several “what works” implications for port security, policy and practice 
to police the illegal drug trade and port employees who are (motivated to be) involved. 
We will therefore provide our key recommendations here. First of all, for several 
preventative measures through policing corruption in the port, in particular the employers, 
vis-a-vis the port companies, play a significant role. This starts at the job application stage, 
where employee background checks ought to be put in place, and specific attention should 
be paid to the financial circumstances, past convictions, drug-related incidents and/or 
gambling problems. Connected to this is the screening of personnel who perform their 
duties in key positions where container information—information that is highly valuable 
for criminal networks—is shared and who have access to handling the container 
throughput. This can be done by consulting organisations in the logistics sector 
responsible for the registration of employees who have violated their occupational 
integrity before. As for those employees with key positions, it becomes important for port 
companies to re-evaluate and restrict who should know what exactly and who should have 
access to what type of information. A compartmentalised way of information sharing, on 
a need-to-know basis, would be worth integrating (Smits, 2014). Another preventative 
measure is to create and stimulate employees’ integrity awareness, by having policing 
authorities and security professionals deliver workshops about the risks of getting 
involved in the ‘rip-off’. It might be worth considering to develop these workshops by 
having a(n) (ex) detainee who used to work in the port and has been convicted for a similar 
offense, to talk about his experiences. As one of the port employees of this study said:  
 
I’ve been very stupid and find it hard, this entire process. I’m absolutely not happy 
about it. On the other hand though, I’m grateful for some reason that I’ve been 
caught, because it put me on the spot. It gives me a lot of time to think about things. 
I’ve deserved a punishment and I hope that during the time I’ll have to do, I can 
repay society. I don’t want to rot away in a cell, ’cause that’ll benefit no one 
(Aldrick). 
 
These workshops and these experiences should lead to the shaping of a culture amongst 
port employees in which people motivate each other to resist the temptation becoming 
complicit in the ‘rip-off’, and instead, to look for alternatives to deal with (financial) 
struggles differently. On top of this, employers ought to have a more pro-active role, 
meaning, port companies should pay more attention to their working staff by detecting 
these struggles and offer means to a way out, such as providing assistance in a debt-relief 
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scheme, or rehabilitation centre in case of addiction issues. Moreover, port management 
should pay more attention to alter the shifts periodically, which means, port employees 
should circulate more frequently between shifts, in order to prevent the establishment of 
a clique that incorporate and stimulate corrupt intentions and behaviour. 
Next to restricting access to information, providing workshops and supporting 
employees, port companies ought to enforce a stronger regulated access control of their 
port facilities, by having it more thoroughly check which port employees come in and at 
what time and who they might be having in their car. Especially in case employees arrive 
long before or after their shift hours, it should trigger security services to ask (more) 
questions about their presence. Finally, as a preventative measure, shared information and 
surveillance could lead to better intelligence for the policing authorities, as well as for the 
port companies itself. The port business community should retrieve (more) feedback from 
the authorities, and the authorities, such as a port police organisation, could benefit from 
up-to-date information on port employees at risk. 
When looking at measures that can be taken repressively, the following 
implications have presented themselves. As the evidence presented here strongly indicate, 
policing ‘rip-offs’ and wider corruption in ports require reconsideration of police 
investigative interview plans. During the investigative interviews, much more attention 
should be paid by police officers to the social background of the suspect, because 
intelligence could be gathered this way about (former) addictions, gambling problems 
and conflicts in the private sphere.  It will help to orientate on the deeper background of 
the financial struggles port employees may have, but also, it would provide a better 
picture of the types of (leisure) environments port employees reside (e.g. casinos, bars or 
clubs) and whether criminal networks are active there, which in turn leads to better 
focused investigations. This way, by having an interest in the social backgrounds, the 
suspect may consider the police to be interested in their lives, and it could also generate 
data for future research and thus an evidence-based (port) policing of drugs and corruption 
could be shaped. It became clear from the motivations of port employees that family, 
especially (ex-)spouse play a bigger role than initially is expected. During the 
investigations, the partners deserve more attention as their (amplified) spending pattern 
could reflect an increase in ‘rip-off’ gained riches as well, given that some port employees 
explained they wanted ‘give their family more to enjoy’. As much as family should be 
focused on more during investigations, also the ties with colleagues of the port employees 
deserve better attention, as it turns out a port employee never acted on his own. In relation 
to this, is the focus that should be stronger on those organisations and professionals who 
might not be employed in the same port company, but those who they do work together 
with on a daily basis (e.g. truckers, shippers, waste-disposal, and organisations providing 
other sorts of transport). 
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Conclusion 
In this contribution, employees of the Port of Rotterdam who fulfilled an important role 
in the illegal drug trade by being involved in ‘rip-off’ cases were considered. Based on 
an in-depth qualitative thematic analysis of official police files of closed criminal 
investigations, the study has shown that port employees have several justifications for 
their corruptive behaviour; justifications that extend beyond mere financial motivations. 
It is most important for them how they are considered by the law enforcement agencies 
to enjoy some if not full impunity, stressing that their (various) addictions, feelings of 
responsibility to support and protection of family (values), and colleagues at work caused 
pressures and seduction to become corrupt and complicit in the ‘rip-off’. It has to be 
emphasised once more that the convicted port employees (presented themselves to) have, 
they claimed, sincere motivations to get involved in the ‘rip-off’. However, it may be the 
case not all those reasons are as genuine as they have explained to the port policing 
agencies. Therefore, future research should further explore the justifications of port 
employees who become corrupt and get involved in not just the illegal drug trade, but 
various types of port crime, in order to adapt and advance (preventative and repressive) 
port policing strategies and operations. Recommendations for preventative and repressive 
measures have been presented as well that indicate a key role for port companies in 
prevention and that law enforcement should have more awareness of the personal 
circumstances and social ties of port employees. 
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